I promise we will be back to Mr. Rifkin shortly, but allow me a personal aside. A long time ago now – it was around 1974 or 1975 – I left the corporate world of Los Angeles and soon ended up in the small town of Oakhurst California. Perhaps it wasn’t the most elegant place in the world but it was right on the border of the gorgeous Yosemite National Park. I spent the next 25 extremely enjoyable years there owning and operating a combination Bookstore Restaurant. Early on in Oakhurst I was amused at the occasional signs I used to see around town that said “We don’t care how they do it in Los Angeles.” It seems that most of the people passing through Oakhurst were from Los Angeles and on their way to visit the exquisite Yosemite National Park. It seems they also often had a lot of advice on how to improve various aspects of the town, or the store, or the streets. I had long since forgotten those quaint little signs until I moved to Paris about four years ago.

I was then, and still am, awed by the magnificence of Paris, but eventually I began moving farther abroad. I visited tiny villages like Crestet and little harbors like Honfleur. I visited fair size towns like Amiens and Rouen and even a couple of the larger cities like Lyon. I found Aix les Bains to be an excellent French version of Oakhurst and Yosemite. Provence is and was superb. I have returned there often. I was charmed, and to be honest, I have never found one place in Paris, or the provinces, that wasn’t worth visiting.

Still there was an undercurrent that at first I couldn’t identify. I watched intently and quietly listened and slowly it dawned on me. Parisians didn’t much like anyone from Provence, or the provinces. North, South, East or West it didn’t seem to matter. Most of the provincials seemed to return the favor. They didn’t much care for Parisians, and they showed it; occasionally blatantly, but usually in just tiny little ways. All the signs told me I was back in Oakhurst in 1975 and those little signs were out. The world is the world, the world over.

I suspect that the pattern pervades. I knew that the Los Angeles/Oakhurst, New York City/Poughkeepsie, or the Washington DC/Denver pattern existed. Now I also know that the Paris/Provence, Paris/Marseille, and Paris/Aix les Bains model exists. These are all minor undercurrents – little problems that might, or might not, illustrate the human condition. Mostly we make little adjustments and no major problems surface. But, what if they are symptomatic?

From reading the news over the years it appears that the pattern repeats on a grander scale: Rome/Palermo or Rome/Naples; London/Cardiff, Belfast, or a host of other towns and villages throughout the UK; Madrid and the Basque Country, or similarly Warsaw/Gdansk. These capital versus country conflicts; the larger versus the smaller; the rural versus the urban; the sophisticated versus the simple – are ever present everywhere. Even in Africa, Asia, and Australia. Even in ancient Babylon and current Chechnya. All these conflicts and contentions* have deep implications for the European Union. The history of Yugoslavia, the history of the United States, indeed all of all history has relevance for the European Union.

A cowboy could think the above. If he were in Washington he might express it one way. If he were in Oakhurst or in Paris he might express it in quite another. Jeremy Rifkin is most definitely not a cowboy, but his parents were. His father was born in Denver, Colorado in 1908 and taught him “that success in life is the result of ninety-nine percent hard work and one percent talent.” His mother was born in El Paso, Texas in 1911 and taught him “in America, you can do anything you choose to do and be anyone you choose to be, if you want to do it or be it badly enough.” As he says: “My parents’ worldview was uncomplicated and very much the product of the frontier mentality.” Still, many Americans of many persuasions would still believe in such sentiments. A Wharton Fellow might turn out to be a little more idealistic, but then most Americans also respect idealism.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Continued below / Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 460 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-18 / EUS

Let’s broaden the focus. If the local/national situation creates some tensions what of the nation/nation rivalries. Does Paris/Rome, Paris/Berlin, Paris/London present any problems? According to Jeremy Rifkin: “Europeans have shown that they can use the tools of dialogue, process, and consensus-building to create bridges among people and put an end to age-old rivalries. The EU’s twenty-five member nations are proof, on a large scale, of the wisdom of their approach” (page 309). Others might consider that an oversimplification. Somewhere between the rosy blue sky and the dark history may lie the truth.

Paris/Rome is a relatively mild case in point. Still, whether it is Silvio Berlusconi or Romano Prodi speaking does make a considerable difference to many French people. Likewise whether the subject is fashion or EADS can color the conversation. Bring up Mussolini or Fascism and the pot can boil over, though in that case, where you are in France, might affect the boiling point. For those with truly long memories we can go all the way back to Caesar and Vercingetorix. It is not a simple situation, or a simple history, then or now. Hope and hard work can bridge the gaps, and mutual benefit can seal the deal, but a simple piece of paper probably won’t do the trick. Only time will tell, and you need a whole lot of time – certainly decades and maybe centuries before you can be sure.

Paris/Berlin blows even hotter and colder. 1870, 1914 and 1939 represents one end of the scale. Konrad Adenauer paired with Charles de Gaulle and/or Gerhard Schroeder with Jacques Chirac represents the other. Whether talk or action is paramount is really crucial to this discussion. Some people say actions speak louder than words, some people hope diplomacy and consensus will rule. Are the Gaullists tottering, will they be gone in 2007? Does it matter? Does history or hope rule? On such questions and answers does the fate of the European Union depend. Again decades or centuries to any real answers, and a millennium to be certain.

Paris/London might be the key and it is probably the most complex rivalry within Europe. For 200 years before Napoleon, and 200 years after, the French loved to hate the English. It was reciprocal, and it was only with the advent of a new number 1 that the French switched their allegiance. Perfidious Albion? Still Britain appears to now rank # 2, and Prince Charles # 3 in this particular sweepstakes. That is a lot of history to overcome. It is possible, but it is difficult. And what of a future Paris/Warsaw or, who knows, Paris/Kiev complication? Or Berlin/Stockholm or….? Europe is rife with possibilities.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

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In our context today perhaps I should call this section Brussels/Washington, for here I want to speak of the relationship between the European Union and the United States. Again we are broadening the focus to now include the international, intercontinental, and the rest of the world outside of Europe. First though, a quick word on the Paris/Washington relationship. It is instructive, and very much worth noting, that for the first 160 years there was a warm and strong affiliation. It is in the last 60 years that it has been progressively deteriorating. While few French or American people today can remember back to the good times, they did occur, and they could again. Not only that, but, for the near future, Franco-American ties are almost certain to improve at least a little.

I have not, and will not, spend a lot of time criticizing my President. I am, and I am pretty sure that I will die, very proud to be an American. That said, I must admit that George Bush has exacerbated the situation with regards to the Paris/Washington connection in particular, and the Washington/World links in general. He could and should have handled them better. Unilateralism can be carried too far, and communication is a dialogue. Still, in my mind, he shares the blame equally with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle and Jacque Chirac (and most of the other French and American leaders in between). The good news is that by 2008 the United States will have new leadership and France very probably will. There is now no way to go but up. As I have said on Tricolors in my articles on Chirac and Gaullism, finally WWII is coming to a close. Let’s slowly rebuild our broken relationship.

Now, back to the broader issue of the European Union vis-à-vis the United States. I think here most Americans, and certainly this one, can agree with Jeremy Rifkin that the EU is a positive development. While many Americans might disagree with particular elements of his analysis, and perhaps with his overall unbridled enthusiasm, I think most would still agree that the EU is good for Europe, good for the US, and good for the world. There will undoubtedly be trade disputes, but the overall view would be that it will be a source of stability for the world. Often, we expect, you will be a likely ally in certain situations. Couple this with the fact that most Americans are descended from immigrants who originally came from Europe, predisposes us to a positive attitude. Besides we see you as just following in our footsteps. Now we will both be just a conglomeration of states. It is a dangerous world and we need each other, especially as our similarities far outweigh our points of contention.

In addition the expanded EU would be seen as a particular positive. The new additions tend to have a relatively positive attitude towards the US. You probably won’t like this, but many Americans would view the expanded EU as a bit of a moderating influence on the French’s rather strong anti-American views during the past 50 or 60 years. That is a good – a win, win, win – and the freer market too will be a benefit for everyone in the long run. Competition will certainly harm some over protected and inefficient markets, but the expanded EU, both as a common market and a world market, will profit. All of this benefits Europe, benefits the United States, and benefits the world. We, each and every one of us, are the world – locally, nationally and internationally.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Continued below / Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 462 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-16 / EUS

So far we have been painting in narrow strokes – a specific locality, this or that state or capital, entities up and down the line – a food chain if you like. Now I would like to broaden the palette, talk of hues and the generalities of geography. First we must hammer again on the difficulties of language and culture. Americans are woefully ignorant of the real France. We know only your fashion, luxury goods and tourism – the tip tops of the mountain peaks and mostly fluff and image. You know virtually nothing of America. You know the movies, the media and McDonalds – the worst of the worst of America. Neither of us have any real inkling of the political institutions or infrastructure, the real history, or the true people of our opposite lands. In fact, no matter on which side of the Atlantic, we both have mothers and fathers, real children and extended families. We both eat and we both sleep. We both bleed and we both cry. All of these things and a host of other basic basics are very similar and very important. None of the little things that we think we know about each other matter very much.

Back to the hues – the red and the blue, two coasts and an interior, the geography of a people. Here I am talking of America – in some contexts Continental America, because the Canadians share our history and our geography. This has deep relevance for the European Union today, and the rest of our world tomorrow. We all – every soul on earth – live on a continent. Jeremy Rifkin writes: “Political analysts divide America into two cultural camps, the reds and the blues, and argue that the former reflect America’s strongly held conservative religious values while the latter are far more liberal and cosmopolitan in their orientation” (page 6). That is a relatively fair summation of the current political significance as far as it goes, and I will be dealing with that aspect when I get to the Republican/Democrat section in a few moments. For now though, it is only the geographical concerns that I want to focus on.

The European Union is topographically beginning to resemble the United States. Mountains and history – rivers, water and natural resources – volcanoes and values – these are all intertwined and inextricable. They were in the United States and the will be in the evolution of the European Union. Of course these effect are felt locally and nationally, but the dynamics are different continentally. Perhaps the frontier is more applicable to Australia or the tundra than downtown Europe, but even France was a frontier once. Caesar certainly thought so. Manifest Destiny doesn’t mean much to a European, but Colonial Empire does. We have to be careful about casting the first stone, but we have to be cognizant of our shared humanity. Mountain men from the Alps or the Rockies may have more in common with each other than they do with their urban brethren in Rome or Washington respectively. It is complex so it is inexact, we are mortal so we misjudge, but we ignore history and/or geography at our own peril.

Today in the United States we may tend to connect the red/blue divide with our political parties and the gridlock of balance in the affairs of state and states. Elections hang in the balance. Before though, it was even more precarious. East/West, urban/rural, rich/poor, agrarian/industrial, religious/secular and North/South considerations have often flamed into conflict. Sometimes very violent conflict. Those who would tell you that our Civil War was about slavery, have way oversimplified the story. It was an issue but it wasn’t the issue. Continental conflicts can be messy. I hope that they are still teaching you what the philosopher and poet George Santayana said: “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” I know that when they drummed that phrase into me in the University I was a little bit skeptical. I was fairly sure that we were the generation that would set things right in the world. Now that I have lived long enough to see history repeat itself innumerable times, I see the wisdom of the poet.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Continued below / Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 463 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-16 / EUS

Let’s shift gears again back across the Atlantic and view this continental issue from the historical perspective of Europe. Here, among many other possibilities, Napoleon, De Gaulle, Munich and Maastricht can provide some light. Napoleon in particular, is a case in point. I wrote about him once in Cowboy in Paris and said, in part: “He’s complex, and I don’t mean that kind of complex, because he’s a giant. Whether for good or ill may depend on whether you’re English, Austrian, Russian, or French, but that Napoleon bestrode the world is uncontestable. France’s greatest victories ever (Austerlitz, Friedland) and also it’s worst defeats (Trafalger, Waterloo) all came under him, and it is perhaps instructive that his biggest battle (Boorodino) was a Pyrrhic Victory at best. Still, he gave France it’s Code Napoleon and it’s Departments (something of a cross between a state and a county). He also brought order out of chaos before he plunged it back into turmoil.” My oh my, such complexity and so many different historical perspectives. It seems history can be written very differently by four different European states.

I can also speak in that vein from personal experience. I grew up in England and France until the age of 8 (1942-1950). I grew up some more in the United States thereafter. I can guarantee you that I learned three very different histories of Charles de Gaulle. Perhaps I shouldn’t tell you what I wrote on Tricolors after all that education. Okay, I will, but you have to promise not to run me out of town on a rail (an old cowboy expression), at least until some time after I have finished my presentation here. I wrote: “Charles de Gaulle gave to France what it most desperately needed in its darkest hour. He gave it back it’s pride. France was mortally wounded at Waterloo and died at Verdun. It disintegrated in the early stages of WWII, though De Gaulle fought well. It was reborn in the persona of a General without an army who stood ramrod straight and declared victory. He substituted talk for action, but it was glorious talk, and the French believed. France was reborn not as a state, but as a state of mind. Talking everything to death was infinitely better than dying. Image trumped substance. There was a little of the Napoleonic Complex redux there, but, when you have nothing, it is best to grab at straws. Sometimes pride cometh after the fall. And on this pride France rebuilt gloriously.” That then, is the result of the three different educations and then living again in France for three more years. Different historical perspectives, all in one lone cowboy.

Munich is a very different matter. No, I am not talking about the movie (2005), nor even the Olympic massacre (1972). We are going back to Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler and 1939. Appeasement. Here, with your 25 countries within the European Union, you probably have 25 different shades of interpretation. You probably couldn’t even agree on the definition of the word appeasement, if only because you would have it in 25 different languages. A person from the original Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Great Britain, Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union would have hugely different perceptions. That would be doubly true if they lived through 1939 and/or the immediate aftermath. Here is not the place to belabor the issue of ‘talk’ versus ‘action’ but one can hardly fail to mention it. Also it is interesting to note that the list of countries – just the names – those too have a significance for the nascent European Union (and the US). Tribes, groupings, countries, alliances, empires – they all come, and they all go. So, what if we had talked of the other Munich? – the massacre and the movie. Same problems, same concerns – only the cast of characters has changed.

Let’s move on to something a little more modern. “The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 transformed the European Economic Community into the European Union. The sweeping provisions of the treaty made clear, once and for all, that the Union was to be far more than a common economic market.” The words are Jeremy Rifkin’s (page 206), and they are true. Maastricht was a turning point, and probably a point of no return. Earlier documents danced around the issues; later agreements progressed beyond; and certainly nothing is final yet, but I expect history will mark this as the fulcrum. Before there was a Common Market, but now it is much closer to a nation. Problems with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty occurred (Denmark). Problems with the current Constitution’s ratification have come about (Denmark and France). Probably other problems will continue to pop up (Britain and Austria). Detours are probable. Additions and even deletions possible. Disintegration though is highly unlikely. You are on the road to a United States of Europe. You are becoming a continental colossus.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 464 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-16 / EUS

Back to the USA. In this section we are not very interested in ideology. It is the mechanics, the balance and the shifting that concerns us. Yes, sometimes I personally lean towards the Republican point of view. Many Republicans would agree with some of the ‘cowboy’s’ views espoused here. Equally many Democrats would agree with a fair number of Rifkin’s thesis. That is not important. What is vital is that many of both groups would be ‘shared’ – of two minds on many of the issues. American politics is all about the middle. Ideology is of interest to Communists and their brethren. Dogma is the province of Fascists and their allies. These persuasions are a small and shifting percentage on either side of the large majority. Depending on the decade and circumstance they usually vary between 2-10%, and very occasionally can reach 15-20%. The last time that happened in the US was in the 1920’s and 30’s. They are not mainstream and they very seldom have any influence on elections, policy or political calculations.

Thus it is the middle that determines virtually all elections and controls the political process in the United States. In fact it is only the middle of the middle that shifts back and forth between Democrats and Republicans. On occasion the more committed of both parties will split off and run an independent, or sometimes even an ideologue, but the result is almost always to hurt their own party and help the opponent’s. Ross Perot (1992), George Wallace (1968), and to a lesser extent Ralph Nader (2000) are cases in point. The result is also that in presidential politics a Democrat or a Republican will always win – you have to go back to 1848 and Zachary Taylor for that not to be the case. The popular vote percentage is usually relatively close – the winner has gotten between 45-55% of the vote in 10 of the last 15 elections. Only twice in that time has the winner exceeded 60% of the popular vote (Richard Nixon 60.7% in 1972, and Lyndon Johnson 61.1% in 1964). I go into these details because this is continental politics, in action, in a democracy. Don’t get too hung up on which color represents which party because over time that varies. What doesn’t vary is that both parties are shifting conglomerates of the middle.

Other elements of American politics will, of necessity, creep into your system of running the European Union. Our system of checks and balances is intricate and worked out over a long period of time in a Democracy. You will have to come up with many of the same solutions, because you will also be a Continental Democracy. The European Union is a group of United States, and the United States is a Continental Union, and both have fairly well developed democratic models. As your priorities vary so will your particulars, but there will always be more similarities than differences. It is a Democracy on a continental scale that requires self correcting mechanisms to balance the bumps, weigh the options, and smooth the conflicts. Committees, governance, majorities, minorities, vetoes, overrides, executive privilege, national, state, local, 50%, 51%, upper houses, lower houses, chairman, ties, 2/3, 75%, nominations, confirmations, presidential prerogatives, judicial independence and a myriad of other considerations will all weigh in the balance. In the end these kind of terms will unite you and probably unite you with us. Your words will be different but your experience the same. And in the end you will probably almost forget the term unanimous. Unanimity only happens in dictatorships not democracies.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 465 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-16 / EUS

Above we have been mostly concerned with elements of politics, geography, history and infrastructure. It is with Conservative/Liberal that we come to a more over-arching term. Of course it has simple political meaning, though on either side of the Atlantic it is not the same. There are elements of a false friend just in the simple terms themselves. We Americans tend to utilize the terms in a more strictly political sense, while you Europeans tend towards the economic interpretation. Somehow Europeans tend to like American Liberals for the very same reason American Conservatives don’t like them. Strangely we tend to like European Liberals, though we might not if we knew that that was what you called them. Most of this discussion belongs in the Second Conference under the philosophical rubric, but the purely economic aspects do have governmental and geographical implications. And particularly the over-arching nature is almost continental by definition.

One of the main reasons Americans are well disposed towards the European Union is an assumption that European ‘liberals’ are more supportive of a free market. We believe barriers to trade will, of necessity, come down in the expanded EU. Not only is there now a majority of countries within the EU in favor, it is manifestly obvious that you can’t have trade barriers within a single country. As you come to grips with that realization world trade will benefit. In a competitive world the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and most of the other new entrants to the EU already see a positive benefit. The transition might be a little more difficult for France, which has a fairly long history of protected markets. Some of your big boys though are already very competitive in the free market – L’Oreal, Carrefour, Danone, LVMH to name a few – and soon others will follow suit. There will probably be no other alternatives.

Still it is the play between conservative and liberal forces in the broader senses that is the most important point for the emerging EU. It is the overall tug and balance, the renewing vitality and the equilibrium that competing interests on a continental scale do provide that is critical. It could produce the countervailing balance the world needs. Europe has never been a united Europe except by force of arms and then only for relatively short periods. A cooperative united Europe is a win economically and probably strategically too. more on the latter in the next installment.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 467 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-16 / EUS

We might, if we were in a particularly undiplomatic mood, call France ‘truculent.’ You might, if you were in a particularly charitable mood, call us ‘truculent.’ You would be happy, but you should be mad. We likewise would probably be mad but should be happy. Look up the definitions in French and English sometime. It’s symptomatic of the pitfalls in Franco-American relations. We can’t even insult or praise each other correctly. Other aspects of language I covered in our preamble. Uncovered were the conflicts that language presents. With our limited linguistic abilities they probably remain better unsaid. Particularly for you though – Europeans in general, and French in particular – the subject needs deep thought.

In the next installment, concerning the military and philosophical aspects of The European Dream, we will be going into considerably more detail on Jeremy Rifkin’s views. Rifkin saw the dream and it was shining. This cowboy saw the history and the geography and it was sometimes daunting, though even there it held some promise. Ideology is for dreamers and reality is for cowboys, and somewhere in between is the truth. Balance is what the United States is about and parity and scale is what the European Union must be about. It will be a different set of balances, but then we together will have to harmonize those concepts.

As I have attempted to show there are pitfalls but mostly there are opportunities. Cautious and conscious optimism can lead the way. Careful and confident idealism is the ticket. We have shown, and you can prove, that continental cooperation can work on a grand scale. Many of the concerns and conflicts that have obsessed you will lessen, but a few will grow. If the United States succeeded you can too and with the lessons of history perhaps you can do it better. This Cowboy in Paris believes it is the magic of the middle that balances extremes, and it is the scale of continents that provide all the necessary elements. It is the melding of all these elements that produces the magic of the middle and the circle of geography and governance.

Originally delivered as a lecture at a conference at the University of Reims, December 18th 2006 by this Cowboy In Paris. It is continued below.

Original appearance December 18, 2006 / RC1 468 / © 2006 / CIP / YP 30/13-16 / EUS

Primary Sources

The European Dream, Jeremy Rifkin, Tarcher/Penguin, 2004

A Cowboy in Paris, David Pitt, Tricolors.com, 2001-2006

The Widening Atlantic, Niall Ferguson, The Atlantic Monthly, Jan/Feb 2005

In the Footsteps of Tocqueville, Bernard-Henri Levy, The Atlantic Monthly, May 2005

The End of Europe, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2005

Transformational Leadership, Joseph Nye, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 2006

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Secondary Sources

A Lawless Global Court, John Rosenthal, Policy Review, Feb/Mar 2004

Nothing to Fear: Washington Should Embrace the European Union, Ronald Asmus et al, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2005

What’s Wrong With Europe, F. Zakaria, Newsweek, June 13, 2005

Another Fine Mess (on the European Union Constitution), The Economist, May 28, 2005

Turkey Dreams of Accession, D. L. Phillips, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2004

The Special Relationship, Then and Now (From the Falklands to Iraq), Laurence Freedman, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006

Declaring Victory, James Fallow, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2006

After Neoconservatism, Francis Fukuyama, New York Times Magazine, Feb 19, 2006

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